相关论文: Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraint…

We study the classic single-item auction setting of Myerson, but under the assumption that the buyers' values for the item are distributed over finite supports. Using strong LP duality and polyhedral theory, we rederive various key results…

Two sellers compete to sell identical products to a single buyer. Each seller chooses an arbitrary mechanism, possibly involving lotteries, to sell their product. The utility-maximizing buyer can choose to participate in one or both…

Consider a monopolist selling $n$ items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions $F_1,F_2,\ldots,F_n$ possibly having unbounded support. Unlike in the single-item case, it is well known that the…

We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\min\{m-k+1,…

Designing an incentive-compatible auction mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue while minimizes the bidders' ex-post regret is an important yet intricate problem in economics. Remarkable progress has been achieved through…

We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…

The classical problem of maximizing a submodular function under a matroid constraint is considered. Defining a new measure for the increments made by the greedy algorithm at each step, called the discriminant, improved approximation ratio…

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…

We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…

We study an online fair division setting, where goods arrive one at a time and there is a fixed set of $n$ agents, each of whom has an additive valuation function over the goods. Once a good appears, the value each agent has for it is…

In this paper, we investigate the online allocation problem of maximizing the overall revenue subject to both lower and upper bound constraints. Compared to the extensively studied online problems with only resource upper bounds, the…

Incentivized social advertising, an emerging marketing model, provides monetization opportunities not only to the owners of the social networking platforms but also to their influential users by offering a "cut" on the advertising revenue.…

Motivated by the applications of rental services in e-commerce, we consider revenue maximization in online assortment of reusable resources for a stream of arriving consumers with different types. We design competitive online algorithms…

We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated,…

A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to…

In the problem called single resource constraint scheduling, we are given $m$ identical machines and a set of jobs, each needing one machine to be processed as well as a share of a limited renewable resource $R$. A schedule of these jobs is…

Motivated by a transit line planning problem in transportation systems, we investigate the following capacitated assignment problem under a budget constraint. Our model involves $L$ bins and $P$ items. Each bin $l$ has a utilization cost…