相关论文: Asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in ri…

Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do not minimize the expected latency so as to obtain lower…

We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. In our model, latencies are subject to (bounded) deviations which are taken into account by the players. The quality…

We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…

We study routing behavior in transportation networks with mixed autonomy, that is, networks in which a fraction of the vehicles on each road are equipped with autonomous capabilities such as adaptive cruise control that enable reduced…

We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…

We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

We investigate packet routing games in which network users selfishly route themselves through a network over discrete time, aiming to reach the destination as quickly as possible. Conflicts due to limited capacities are resolved by the…

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…

We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which…

We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…

Internet and graphs are very much related. The graphical structure of internet has been studied extensively to provide efficient solutions to routing and other problems. But most of these studies assume a central authority which controls…

In this paper, we tackle the problem of risk-averse route planning in a transportation network with time-dependent and stochastic costs. To solve this problem, we propose an adaptation of the A* algorithm that accommodates any risk measure…

In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…

The fast-growing market of autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fleets in general necessitates the design of smart and automatic navigation systems considering the stochastic latency along different paths in the traffic…

We study the performance of the linear consensus algorithm on strongly connected directed graphs using the linear quadratic (LQ) cost as a performance measure. In particular, we derive bounds on the LQ cost by leveraging effective…

In the network design game with $n$ players, every player chooses a path in an edge-weighted graph to connect her pair of terminals, sharing costs of the edges on her path with all other players fairly. We study the price of stability of…

We introduce weighted Markovian graphs, a random walk model that decouples the transition dynamics of a Markov chain from (random) edge weights representing the cost of traversing each edge. This decoupling allows us to study the…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

Within mobility systems, the presence of self-interested users can lead to aggregate routing patterns that are far from the societal optimum which could be achieved by centrally controlling the users' choices. In this paper, we design a…