相关论文: Signaling in Quasipolynomial time

Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…

In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…

In this paper, we propose a novel class of Nash problems for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks composed of multiple primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) wherein each SU (player) competes against the others to maximize his own…

We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…

We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…

Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…

The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single…

This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…

This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an…

In this paper, we studied the equilibrium problem where the bi-function may be quasiconvex with respect to the second variable and the feasible set is the intersection of a finite number of convex sets. We propose a projection-algorithm,…

We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the…