相关论文: Pigouvian Tolls and Welfare Optimality with Parall…

When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…

When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…

We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents, it is known that…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

Motivated by the impact of emerging technologies on toll parks, this paper studies a problem of equilibrium, social welfare, and revenue for an infinite-server queue. More specifically, we assume that a customer's utility consists of a…

We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…

In the current intensively changing technological environment, wireless network operators try to manage the increase of global traffic, optimizing the use of the available resources. This involves associating each user to one of its…

I develop a theoretical model to examine how the rise of autonomous AI (artificial intelligence) agents disrupts two-sided digital advertising markets. Through this framework, I demonstrate that users' rational, private decisions to…

In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a "Pigouvian" tax may also induce other,…

In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation mechanisms yielding polynomial time algorithms with optimal…

In recent years, there is a growing research about queueing models with customers who choose their service durations. In general, the model assumptions in the existing literature imply that every customer knows his service demand when he…

Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user…

Self-interested routing polices from individual users in a system can collectively lead to poor aggregate congestion in routing networks. The introduction of altruistic agents, whose goal is to benefit other agents in the system, can…

Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing users in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user behavior in…

The introduction of autonomous (self-driving) and shared autonomous vehicles (AVs and SAVs) will affect travel destinations and distances, mode choice, and congestion. From a traffic perspective, although some congestion reduction may be…

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…

With autonomous vehicles now sharing roads with human drivers, the era of mixed autonomy brings new challenges in dealing with congestion. One cause of congestion is when vehicle users choose their routes selfishly to minimize their…

This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum flow in equilibrium.…