相关论文: On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-pl…

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…

We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…

We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…

This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. We fix a mean, $\mu$, in the interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the…

We prove that in a normal form n-player game with m actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium where each player randomizes uniformly among a set of O(log(m) + log(n)) pure strategies. This result induces an…

We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…

This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…

In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…

Static stability in economic models means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been…