Partially Observed Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games
Abstract
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each agent is weakly coupled with the rest of the population through its individual cost and state dynamics via the empirical distribution of states. We establish the mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit using the technique of converting the underlying original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle. Then, we show that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents. We first consider finite-horizon cost function, and then, discuss extension of the result to infinite-horizon cost in the next-to-last section of the paper.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2003.11987,
title = {Partially Observed Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games},
author = {Naci Saldi and Tamer Basar and Maxim Raginsky},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.11987},
year = {2022}
}
Comments
37 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1705.02036, arXiv:1808.03929