相关论文: The existence and uniqueness of a power price equi…
We formulate an equilibrium model of intraday trading in electricity markets. Agents face balancing constraints between their customers consumption plus intraday sales and their production plus intraday purchases. They have continuously…
We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppliers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different qualities; each…
In this paper we propose a tractable quadratic programming formulation for calculating the equilibrium term structure of electricity prices. We rely on a theoretical model described in [21], but extend it so that it reflects actually traded…
In this paper, we show that if every consumer in an economy has a quasi-linear utility function, then the normalized equilibrium price is unique, and is locally stable with respect to the t\^atonnement process. Our study can be seen as that…
In an electric power system, demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Furthermore, in the near future, deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to exacerbate the variability…
In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…
As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…
In this study, we develop a theoretical model of strategic equilibrium bidding and price-setting behaviour by heterogeneous and boundedly rational electricity producers and a grid operator in a single electricity market under uncertain…
Here, we introduce a price-formation model where a large number of small players can store and trade electricity. Our model is a constrained mean-field game (MFG) where the price is a Lagrange multiplier for the supply vs. demand balance…
We study optimal monopoly pricing over consumer networks governed by general nonlinear utilities. In our framework, a consumer's utility is jointly determined by an individualized price and the consumption choices of their peers, propagated…
We propose a new structural model that can compute the electricity spot and forward prices in two coupled markets with limited interconnection and multiple fuels. We choose a structural approach in order to represent some key…
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…
A minimal model of a market of myopic non-cooperative agents who trade bilaterally with random bids reproduces qualitative features of short-term electric power markets, such as those in California and New England. Each agent knows its own…
In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…