相关论文: An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Pr…

Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…

Mediation is a process, in which both parties agree to resolve their dispute by negotiating over alternative solutions presented by a mediator. In order to construct such solutions, mediation brings more information and knowledge, and, if…

We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…

We introduce a class of financial contracts involving several parties by extending the notion of a two-person game option (see Kifer (2000)) to a contract in which an arbitrary number of parties is involved and each of them is allowed to…

The notion that economies should normally be in equilibrium is by now well-established; equally well-established is that economies are almost never precisely in equilibrium. Using a very general formulation, we show that under dynamics that…

In the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed an ordinal and set-valued solution concept for zero-sum games called \emph{weak saddle}. We show that all weak saddles of a given zero-sum game are interchangeable and equivalent. As a consequence,…

We investigate multi-organizational scheduling problems, building upon the framework introduced by Pascual et al.[2009]. In this setting, multiple organizations each own a set of identical machines and sequential jobs with distinct…

We derive behavioral finance option pricing formulas consistent with the rational dynamic asset pricing theory. In the existing behavioral finance option pricing formulas, the price process of the representative agent is not a…

Although behavioral economics has demonstrated that there are many situations where rational choice is a poor empirical model, it has so far failed to provide quantitative models of economic problems such as price formation. We make a step…

There has been much work on exhibiting mechanisms that implement various bargaining solutions, in particular, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution \cite{moulin1984implementing} and the Nash Bargaining solution. Another well-known and…

Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…

We relate two contract models: one based on event structures and game theory, and the other one based on logic. In particular, we show that the notions of agreement and winning strategies in the game-theoretic model are related to that of…

We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…

This contribution focuses on two-party negotiation over continuous issues. We firstly prove two drawbacks of the jointly Improving Direction Method (IDM), namely that IDM is not a Strategy-Proof (SP) nor an Information Concealing (IC)…

A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for…

The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear…

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…

Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these…

Bargaining is an important and unique part of negotiation between humans. As LLM-driven agents learn to negotiate and act like real humans, how to evaluate agents' bargaining abilities remains an open problem. For the first time, we…