相关论文: An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Pr…

Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even…

In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoff is introduced. It is based on extensions of vector orders in K-dimensional spaces to order relations in their power sets, so-called set relations, and…

This paper investigates the problem of finding a preference relation on a set of acts from the knowledge of an ordering on events (subsets of states of the world) describing the decision-maker (DM)s uncertainty and an ordering of…

The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…

Existing multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) algorithms do not account for objectives that arise from players with differing beliefs. Concretely, consider two players with different beliefs and utility functions who may cooperate…

In multi-objective optimization, a single decision vector must balance the trade-offs between many objectives. Solutions achieving an optimal trade-off are said to be Pareto optimal: these are decision vectors for which improving any one…

Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is an important modal logic used to specify and reason about the behavior of software. A challenging problem in the context of PDL is solving fixed-point equations, i.e., formulae of the form $x \equiv…

We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…

In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information,…

In multiobjective optimization, most branch and bound algorithms provide the decision maker with the whole Pareto front, and then decision maker could select a single solution finally. However, if the number of objectives is large, the…

It is known that the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality. Our aim in this work is to introduce a variational approach to study the existence of solutions for generalized ordinal Nash…

We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…

Pricing financial or real options with arbitrary payoffs in regime-switching models is an important problem in finance. Mathematically, it is to solve, under certain standard assumptions, a general form of optimal stopping problems in…

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's…

The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…

Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…

In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that…

We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent…