相关论文: Conditional Expectations of Correspondences

We present some regularity properties (convexity, weak/weak* compactness and preservation of weak/weak* upper hemicontinuity) for Bochner/Gelfand conditional expectation of Banach valued correspondences under the nowhere equivalence…

We prove some regularity properties (convexity, closedness, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity) for distribution and regular conditional distribution of correspondences under the nowhere equivalence condition. We show the…

We show that each of the regularity properties of regular conditional distributions of correspondences (convexity, closedness, compactness, and preservation of closed graphs) is equivalent to the condition of nowhere equivalence. This…

This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient…

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…

We consider discrete-time uncertain processes with finite state space and study the properties of game-theoretic upper expectations developed by Shafer and Vovk. We start by proving some basic properties, e.g. monotonicity, law of iterated…

We introduce the notions of weakly *-concave and weakly naturally quasi-concave correspondence and prove fixed point theorems and continuous selection theorems for these kind of correspondences. As applications in the game theory, by using…

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…

An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…

In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known.…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

A description of static equilibria in the noisy binary choice (Ising) game on complete and random graphs resulting from maximisation of the likelihood of system configurations is presented. An equivalence of such likelihood equilibria to…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

We introduce the notions of w-lower semicontinuous and almost w-lower semicontinuous correspondence with respect to a given set and prove a new fixed-point theorem. We also introduce the notion of correspondence with e-LSCS-property. As…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where rational entities interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance…

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…

A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…