相关论文: Conditional Expectations of Correspondences

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…

We address an open problem on the computability of correlated equilibria in a variant of polymatrix where each player's utility is the maximum of their edge payoffs. We demonstrate that this max-variant game has the polynomial expectation…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…

We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…

We study the existence of equilibrium when agents' preferences may not beconvex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficientcondition under which there exists an equilibrium. The standard approach cannot be…

In this paper, I prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a large class of games with nonconvex strategy spaces. Specifically, if each player's strategies form a compact, connected Euclidean neighborhood retract and if…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

In this paper, we introduce several types of correspondences: weakly naturally quasiconvex, *-weakly naturally quasiconvex, weakly biconvex and correspondences with *--weakly convex graph and we prove some fixed point theorems for these…

Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

We show the existence and effective computability of optimal winning strategies for request-response games in case the quality of a play is measured by the limit superior of the mean accumulated waiting times between requests and their…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

Research in Economics and Game theory has necessitated results on Carath\'eodory-type selections. In particular, one has to obtain Carath\'eodory type-selections from correspondences that need not be continuous (neither lower-semicontinuous…