相关论文: Double-interval societies

The pairwise winning indices, computed in the Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis, give the probability with which an alternative is preferred to another taking into account all the instances of the assumed preference model…

We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…

In populations with community structure, the formation of consensus requires both alignment within and diffusion of beliefs across groups, processes that evolve on distinct time scales. How do modularity, asymmetry, and polarization shape…

In the standard $q$-voter model, a given agent can change its opinion only if there is a full consensus of the opposite opinion within a group of influence of size $q$. A more realistic extension is the threshold $q$-voter, where a minimal…

This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…

When people pursue rewards in stochastic environments, they often match their choice frequencies to the observed target frequencies, even when this policy is demonstrably sub-optimal. We used a ``hide and seek'' task to evaluate this…

Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…

We investigate a majority-vote model on two-layer multiplex networks with community structure. In our majority-vote model, the edges on each layer encode one type of social relationship and an individual changes their opinion based on the…

We study the multifaceted question of how to sample approval elections in a meaningful way. Our analysis aims to discern the properties of various statistical cultures (both established and new ones). Based on the map-of-elections framework…

Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…

In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order…

Colloquially, there are two groups, $n$ men and $n$ women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching.…

In this paper, we study the following problem. Consider a setting where a proposal is offered to the vertices of a given network $G$, and the vertices must conduct a vote and decide whether to accept the proposal or reject it. Each vertex…

In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but…

We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…

The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations, in which an individual is motivated to help another to acquire a good reputation and receive help from others afterwards. Ingroup favoritism is another aspect…

We study popular matchings in three classical settings: the house allocation problem, the marriage problem, and the roommates problem. In the popular matching problem, (a subset of) the vertices in a graph have preference orderings over…

Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…

A number of applications require two-sample testing on ranked preference data. For instance, in crowdsourcing, there is a long-standing question of whether pairwise comparison data provided by people is distributed similar to…