相关论文: Double-interval societies

In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…

The Axelrod model is a spatial stochastic model for the dynamics of cultures which, similarly to the voter model, includes social influence, but differs from the latter by also accounting for another social factor called homophily, the…

This paper considers the consensus problem of a novel opinion dynamics model with group pressure and self-confidence. Different with the most existing paper, the influence of friends of friends in a social network is taken into account,…

A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has…

The stochastic block model is a popular tool for detecting community structures in network data. Detecting the difference between two community structures is an important issue for stochastic block models. However, the two-sample test has…

The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…

Two of the main factors shaping an individual's opinion are social coordination and personal preferences, or personal biases. To understand the role of those and that of the topology of the network of interactions, we study an extension of…

Strongly opinionated minorities can have a dramatic impact on the opinion dynamics of a large population. Two factions of inflexible minorities, polarised into two competing opinions, could lead the entire population to persistent…

We study an outcome of a vote in a population of voters exposed to an externally applied bias in favour of one of two potential candidates. The population consists of ordinary individuals, that are in majority and tend to align their…

We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…

We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…

Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…

An electorate with fully-ranked innate preferences casts approval votes over a finite set of alternatives. As a result, only partial information about the true preferences is revealed to the voting authorities. In an effort to understand…

Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if…

The constrained consensus problem considered in this paper, denoted interval consensus, is characterized by the fact that each agent can impose a lower and upper bound on the achievable consensus value. Such constraints can be encoded in…

We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…

The goal of this paper is to estimate some parameters of simple social harmonic oscillations modelling U.S. Presidential Approval and Macropartisanship. The harmonic oscillations are simplest solutions of equations of the deterministic…

Signed networks contain edge annotations to indicate whether each interaction is friendly (positive edge) or antagonistic (negative edge). The model is simple but powerful and it can capture novel and interesting structural properties of…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. The popular matchings problem can be defined as follows: Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges…