相关论文: The core of the games with fractional linear utili…

This paper proposes a novel algorithm to approximate the core of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games via linear programming. Given the computational hardness of determining the full core, our approach provides a tractable…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…

Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…

Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…

Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…

With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…

A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…

LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of the core, right from its early days to the present time. However, despite the extensive nature of this work, basic gaps still remain. We address these gaps using the following…

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network…

We study the nucleolus in a class of cooperative games where agents collaborate by sharing demands and production-distribution capacities across multiple markets. These production-distribution games form a structured subclass of linear…

We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…

The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…

We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands…

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem for infinite TU-games with and without restricted…

In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…