相关论文: Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous Poo…
Renal patients which have a willing but incompatible donor can decide to participate in a kidney exchange program (KEP). The goal of a KEP is to identify sets of such incompatible pairs that can exchange donors, leading to compatible…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…
To this day, there are still some countries where the exchange of kidneys between multiple incompatible patient-donor pairs is restricted by law. Typically, legal regulations in this context are put in place to prohibit coercion and…
Each year, thousands of patients in need of heart transplants face life-threatening wait times due to organ scarcity. While allocation policies aim to maximize population-level outcomes, current approaches often fail to account for the…
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
This paper addresses the problem of maximizing the expected size of a matching in the case of unreliable vertices and/or edges. The assumption is that upon failure, remaining vertices that have not been matched may be subject to a new…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
Kidney Exchange Programmes (KEPs) facilitate the exchange of kidneys, and larger pools of recipient-donor pairs tend to yield proportionally more transplants, leading to the proposal of international KEPs (IKEPs). However, as studied by…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is to find a constellation of exchanges that maximizes the number of transplants that can be carried out for a set of pairs of patients with kidney disease and their incompatible donors. Recently, this…
The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
We introduce the Stackelberg kidney exchange problem. In this problem, an agent (e.g. a hospital or a national organization) has control over a number of incompatible patient-donor pairs whose patients are in need of a transplant. The agent…
Patients with end-stage kidney disease can expect to wait for several years before they receive a transplant, all the while their health deteriorates. How would the survival change if we managed to reduce these waiting times? To provide an…
Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease, yet the scarcity of donors and inefficiencies in allocation systems create major bottlenecks, resulting in prolonged wait times and alarming mortality rates.…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
Despite efforts to increase the supply of organs from living donors, most kidney transplants performed in Australia still come from deceased donors. The age of these donated organs has increased substantially in recent decades as the rate…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…