相关论文: Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Poten…

Logit Dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] are randomized best response dynamics for strategic games: at every time step a player is selected uniformly at random and she chooses a new strategy according to a probability…

We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…

We present the first general bounds on the mixing time of the Markov chain associated to the logit dynamics for wide classes of strategic games. The logit dynamics with inverse noise beta describes the behavior of a complex system whose…

Logit dynamics are dynamical systems describing transitions and equilibria of actions of interacting players under uncertainty. An uncertainty is embodied in logit dynamic as a softmax type function often called a logit function originating…

Logit dynamics is a form of randomized game dynamics where players have a bias towards strategic deviations that give a higher improvement in cost. It is used extensively in practice. In congestion (or potential) games, the dynamics…

We study "logit dynamics" [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly at random and she plays according to a "noisy" best-response…

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…

Logit choice dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the logit choice function [McFadden, 1974], used for modeling players with limited rationality and knowledge. In this paper we study the all-logit dynamics,…

We present a new family of logit-Q dynamics for efficient learning in stochastic games by combining the log-linear learning (also known as logit dynamics) for the repeated play of normal-form games with Q-learning for unknown Markov…

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a…

In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…

We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak…

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…

Logit-response dynamics (Alos-Ferrer and Netzer, Games and Economic Behavior 2010) are a rich and natural class of noisy best-response dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the…

This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…

We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…