相关论文: The value of Markov Chain Games with incomplete in…

In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…

We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This result extends previous results on…

We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of…

This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…

We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…

We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…

We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the…

We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability $\frac 12\le p\le 1$). H\"orner,…

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…

This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…

We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in…

Differential games with asymmetric information were introduced by Cardaliaguet (2007). As in repeated games with lack of information on both sides (Aumann and Maschler (1995)), each player receives a private signal (his type) before the…

We consider two person zero-sum games where the players control, at discrete times {tn} induced by a partition $\Pi$ of R + , a continuous time Markov state process. We prove that the limit of the values v$\Pi$ exist as the mesh of $\Pi$…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…