相关论文: The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization (Wor…

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…

Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…

We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the…

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…

This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…

In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities.…

We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show…

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas…

The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the…

We introduce a two-player game, in which each player extends a given sequence by picking a free element in a domain D of the real line. The aim of the players is to control the parity of the number of transpositions necessary to put the…

An agent-based model for financial markets has to incorporate two aspects: decision making and price formation. We introduce a simple decision model and consider its implications in two different pricing schemes. First, we study its…

The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference sets that can appear for a dominant strategy incentive…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

In this paper we introduce novel algorithmic strategies for effciently playing two-player games in which the players have different or identical player roles. In the case of identical roles, the players compete for the same objective (that…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers. Crucially, sellers cannot price-discriminate between buyers. We model the structure of the…

A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…

Cooperation is fundamental for society's viability, as it enables the emergence of structure within heterogeneous groups that seek collective well-being. However, individuals are inclined to defect in order to benefit from the group's…

We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…