相关论文: Choosing Products in Social Networks

In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…

This paper introduces algorithm instance games (AIGs) as a conceptual classification applying to games in which outcomes are resolved from joint strategies algorithmically. For such games, a fundamental question asks: How do the details of…

In this paper, we study a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks. We consider two competing firms in a market providing two substitutable products with preset qualities. Agents choose their consumptions…

Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…

We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…

In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…

Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network, where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate…

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address…

We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…

Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the…

We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…

In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in…

We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…

A supermarket game is considered with $N$ FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate $N \lambda$. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…