相关论文: A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem witho…
We establish the satisfiability threshold for random $k$-SAT for all $k\ge k_0$, with $k_0$ an absolute constant. That is, there exists a limiting density $\alpha_*(k)$ such that a random $k$-SAT formula of clause density $\alpha$ is with…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption…
People are often challenged to select one among several alternatives. This situation is present not only in decisions about complex issues, e.g., political or academic choices, but also about trivial ones, as in daily purchases at a…
The final version of a new approach to quantum theory is formulated in this paper. The basis is taken to be theoretical variables, variables that may be accessible or inaccessible, i.e., it may be possible or impossible for an observer to…
A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's $\gamma$ axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be chosen from the union of the menus. Expansion consistency…
We offer a new proof of Furstenberg and Katznelson's density version of the Hales-Jewett Theorem: For any $\delta > 0$ there is some $N_0 \geq 1$ such that whenever $A \subseteq [k]^N$ with $N \geq N_0$ and $|A|\geq \delta k^N$, $A$…
We extend the recently introduced framework of metric distortion to multiwinner voting. In this framework, $n$ agents and $m$ alternatives are located in an underlying metric space. The exact distances between agents and alternatives are…
Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, ...), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and…
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is increasing concern that such results may not re ect the…
In this paper, we present a private voting system that consists of N authorized voters who may vote to one of the K candidates or vote abstain. Each voter wants to compute the final tally while staying private and robust against malicious…
We introduce the anonymity group, the neutrality group and the symmetry group of a social preference function. Inspired by a problem posed by Kelly in 1991 and remained unsolved, we investigate the problem of recognizing which permutation…
In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons…
Let $v(n)$ be the minimum number of voters with transitive preferences which are needed to generate any strong preference pattern (ties not allowed) on $n$ candidates. Let $k=\lfloor \log_2 n\rfloor$. We show that $v(n)\le n-k$ if $n$ and…
Some practical results are derived for population inference based on a sample, under the two qualitative conditions of 'ignorability' and exchangeability. These are the 'Histogram Theorem', for predicting the outcome of a non-sampled member…
In most sociophysical simulations on public opinion, only two opinions are allowed: Pro and Contra. However, in all political elections many people do not vote. Here we analyse two models of dynamics of public opinion, taking into account…
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to…
How many $k$-SAT functions on $n$ boolean variables are there? What does a typical such function look like? Bollob\'as, Brightwell, and Leader conjectured that, for each fixed $k \ge 2$, the number of $k$-SAT functions on $n$ variables is…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…