The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
Theoretical Economics
2020-07-06 v2
Abstract
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.06341,
title = {The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference},
author = {Achille Basile and Surekha Rao and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.06341},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
JEL Code: D71