相关论文: A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem witho…

By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of…

Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.

We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…

Arrow's Theorem concerns a fundamental problem in social choice theory: given the individual preferences of members of a group, how can they be aggregated to form rational group preferences? Arrow showed that in an election between three or…

Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. This means that a single voter or a group of colluding…

In [G. Kalai, A Fourier-theoretic Perspective on the Condorcet Paradox and Arrow's Theorem, Adv. in Appl. Math. 29(3) (2002), pp. 412--426], Kalai investigated the probability of a rational outcome for a generalized social welfare function…

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in…

Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism implements…

May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…

By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…

This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented unless…

Revised proofs of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem have been presented in prose form, incorporating novel ideas such as decisive sets and pivotal voters. This study develops another approach to proving the theorem. Using a proof…

We consider the social welfare function a la Arrow, where some voters are not qualified to evaluate some alternatives. Thus, the inputs of the social welfare function are the preferences of voters on the alternatives that they are qualified…

We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…

With $G_k(n)$ the number of functions of $n$ boolean variables definable by $k$-SAT formulae, we prove that $G_3(n)$ is asymptotic to $2^{n+\binom{n}{3}}$. This is a strong form of the case $k=3$ of a conjecture of Bollob\'as, Brightwell…

We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…

Algorithms for resolving majority cycles in preference aggregation have been studied extensively in computational social choice. Several sophisticated cycle-resolving methods, including Tideman's Ranked Pairs, Schulze's Beat Path, and…

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a Dictator has to be non-transitive. In this paper we study quantitative versions of Arrow…