相关论文: Effects of noise on convergent game learning dynam…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
Demographic noise has profound effects on evolutionary and population dynamics, as well as on chemical reaction systems and models of epidemiology. Such noise is intrinsic and due to the discreteness of the dynamics in finite populations.…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
Effect of noise in inducing order on various chaotically evolving systems is reviewed, with special emphasis on systems consisting of coupled chaotic elements. In many situations it is observed that the uncoupled elements when driven by…
We build on an emerging line of work which studies strategic manipulations in training data provided to machine learning algorithms. Specifically, we focus on the ubiquitous task of linear regression. Prior work focused on the design of…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
Can noise be beneficial to machine-learning prediction of chaotic systems? Utilizing reservoir computers as a paradigm, we find that injecting noise to the training data can induce a stochastic resonance with significant benefits to both…
We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multi-player games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and…
Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…
We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sustained by perturbations…
In this paper, a non-autonomous stochastic logistic system is considered. An interesting result on the effect of stochastically perturbation for the dynamic behavior are obtained. That is, under certain conditions the stochastic system have…
We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient approximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the "imitation of success". In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the…
Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like…