相关论文: Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatia…

Evolution is based on the assumption that competing players update their strategies to increase their individual payoffs. However, while the applied updating method can be different, most of previous works proposed uniform models where…

We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators…

In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction $\alpha$ of the payoffs of each player gained from direct game interactions is shared equally…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that…

The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population…

We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius $R$. Adopting the prisoner's dilemma game and…

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world…

Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even…

Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…

Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…

Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…

Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…

A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where…

Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…