相关论文: Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of c…

We initiate the study of approximate maximum matching in the vertex partition model, for graphs subject to dynamic changes. We assume that the $n$ vertices of the graph are partitioned among $k$ players, who execute a distributed algorithm…

Understanding how cooperation can evolve in populations despite its cost to individual cooperators is an important challenge. Models of spatially structured populations with one individual per node of a graph have shown that cooperation,…

The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of…

In evolutionary dynamics, the probability that a mutation spreads through the whole population, having arisen in a single individual, is known as the fixation probability. In general, it is not possible to find the fixation probability…

We introduce a model for a growing random graph based on simultaneous reproduction of the vertices. The model can be thought of as a generalisation of the reproducing graphs of Southwell and Cannings and Bonato et al to allow for a random…

We consider a group of agents on a graph who repeatedly play the prisoner's dilemma game against their neighbors. The players adapt their actions to the past behavior of their opponents by applying the win-stay lose-shift strategy. On a…

The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on selection. We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of fixed size in a changing environment. The population dynamics are driven by birth and death…

Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. Static population structures can be described by graphs, where individuals occupy the nodes, and interactions occur along the edges. General conditions for evolutionary success…

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…

This paper presents a computational evolutionary game model to study and understand fraud dynamics in the consumption tax system. Players are cooperators if they correctly declare their value added tax (VAT), and are defectors otherwise.…

In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…

Paper proposes a model of large networks based on a random preferential attachment graph with addition of complete subgraphs (cliques). The proposed model refers to models of random graphs following the nonlinear preferential attachment…

One of the most influential recent results in network analysis is that many natural networks exhibit a power-law or log-normal degree distribution. This has inspired numerous generative models that match this property. However, more recent…

Different evolutionary models are known to make disparate predictions for the success of an invading mutant in some situations. For example, some evolutionary mechanics lead to amplification of selection in structured populations, while…

We derive normal approximation results for a class of stabilizing functionals of binomial or Poisson point process, that are not necessarily expressible as sums of certain score functions. Our approach is based on a flexible notion of the…

We study a continuous time Markov process whose state space consists of an assignment of +1 or -1 to each vertex of a graph G. The graphs that we treat are related to homogeneous trees of degree K $\geq$ 3, such as finite or infinite stacks…

The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to research how cooperation arises. The…

Consider a distributed graph where each vertex holds one of two distinct opinions. In this paper, we are interested in synchronous voting processes where each vertex updates its opinion according to a predefined common local updating rule.…

In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait's success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This "fixation probability" is difficult to compute in general, as…

Various social dilemma games that follow different strategy updating rules have been studied on many networks.The reported results span the entire spectrum, from significantly boosting,to marginally affecting,to seriously decreasing the…