相关论文: Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

Fixed-parameter tractability analysis and scheduling are two core domains of combinatorial optimization which led to deep understanding of many important algorithmic questions. However, even though fixed-parameter algorithms are appealing…

Stacking is a general approach for combining multiple models toward greater predictive accuracy. It has found various application across different domains, ensuing from its meta-learning nature. Our understanding, nevertheless, on how and…

In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…

We study social welfare of learning outcomes in mechanisms with admission. In our repeated game there are $n$ bidders and $m$ mechanisms, and in each round each mechanism is available for each bidder only with a certain probability. Our…

We study the budgeted laminar matroid independent set problem. The input is a ground set, where each element has a cost and a non-negative profit, along with a laminar matroid over the elements and a budget. The goal is to select a maximum…

The knapsack problem (KP) is a very famous NP-hard problem in combinatorial optimization. Also its generalization to multiple dimensions named d-dimensional knapsack problem (d-KP) and to multiple knapsacks named multiple knapsack problem…

Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a…

In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page. This gives rise to a bipartite matching market that is…

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…

Matching mechanisms play a central role in operations management across diverse fields including education, healthcare, and online platforms. However, experimentally comparing a new matching algorithm against a status quo presents some…

Consider the following problem: given a set system (U,I) and an edge-weighted graph G = (U, E) on the same universe U, find the set A in I such that the Steiner tree cost with terminals A is as large as possible: "which set in I is the most…

The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents. We focus on aggregating preferences from $n$ players in a context without…

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…

In the stochastic knapsack problem, we are given a knapsack of size B, and a set of jobs whose sizes and rewards are drawn from a known probability distribution. However, we know the actual size and reward only when the job completes. How…

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…

In this paper, we study the stochastic submodular maximization problem with dependent items subject to packing constraints such as matroid and knapsack constraints. The input of our problem is a finite set of items, and each item is in a…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

In this paper we propose a constrained guaranteed cost robust model predictive controller (GCMPC) for uncertain discrete time systems. This controller was developed based on a quadratic cost functional and guarantee robustness with respect…

This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…

In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…