相关论文: Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…
Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…
We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
This paper investigates the problem of single-source multicasting over a communication network in the presence of restricted adversaries. When the adversary is constrained to operate only on a prescribed subset of edges, classical cut-set…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
We study minimum entropy submodular optimization, a common generalization of the minimum entropy set cover problem, studied earlier by Cardinal et al., and the submodular set cover problem. We give a general bound of the approximation…
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…
Emerging network paradigms and applications increasingly rely on federated learning (FL) to enable collaborative intelligence while preserving privacy. However, the sustainability of such collaborative environments hinges on a fair and…
We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…
In this paper, we consider a generalization of cooperative games to the case where a coalition can distribute the earned utility not only among its members but also to other players. In particular, we consider an example where coalitions…
We study the core of normal form games with a continuum of players and without side payments. We consider the weak-core concept, which is an approximation of the core, introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. For payoffs depending on the…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
The core of a game $v$ on $N$, which is the set of additive games $\phi$ dominating $v$ such that $\phi(N)=v(N)$, is a central notion in cooperative game theory, decision making and in combinatorics, where it is related to submodular…
Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…