相关论文: Spanning connectivity games
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
Suppose that $n$ computer devices are to be connected to a network via inhomogeneous Bernoulli trials. The Shapley value of a device quantifies how much the network's value increases due to the participation of that device. Characteristic…
Within the domain of game theory, power indexes are defined as functions that quantify the influence of individual participants in collective decision-making processes. Felsenthal [D. Felsenthal. A Well-Behaved Index of a Priori P-Power for…
This work focuses on developing efficient post-hoc explanations for quantum AI algorithms. In classical contexts, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value adapts naturally to post-hoc explanations, where it can be used to…
Coordination graph is a promising approach to model agent collaboration in multi-agent reinforcement learning. It conducts a graph-based value factorization and induces explicit coordination among agents to complete complicated tasks.…
The weighted Szeged index and the weighted vertex-PI index of a connected graph $G$ are defined as $wSz(G) = \sum_{e=uv \in E(G)} (deg (u) + deg (v))n_u(e)n_v(e)$ and $wPI_v(G) = \sum_{e=uv \in E(G)} (deg(u) + deg(v))( n_u(e) + n_v(e))$,…
A path query extracts vertex tuples from a labeled graph, based on the words that are formed by the paths connecting the vertices. We study the computational complexity of measuring the contribution of edges and vertices to an answer to a…
The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…
Consider the following two-player game on the edges of $K_n$, the complete graph with $n$ vertices: Starting with an empty graph $G$ on the vertex set of $K_n$, in each round the first player chooses $b \in \mathbb{N}$ edges from $K_n$…
The Banzhaf power and interaction indexes for a pseudo-Boolean function (or a cooperative game) appear naturally as leading coefficients in the standard least squares approximation of the function by a pseudo-Boolean function of a specified…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific independence between players' utility functions. Actions are represented as nodes in a graph G, and the payoff…
In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…
Scores based on Shapley values are widely used for providing explanations to classification results over machine learning models. A prime example of this is the influential SHAP-score, a version of the Shapley value that can help explain…
Independent set games are cooperative games defined on graphs, where players are edges and the value of a coalition is the maximum cardinality of independent sets in the subgraph defined by the coalition. In this paper, we investigate the…
The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
We introduce and analyze a novel family of power indices tailored for sharing networks in technological markets, where firms operate competitively within, but not across, distinct industrial sectors. In these settings, inter-firm…
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…