相关论文: The norm game on a model network: a critical line

Social norms are shared rules that govern and facilitate social interaction. Violating such social norms via teasing and insults may serve to upend power imbalances or, on the contrary reinforce solidarity and rapport in conversation,…

In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in…

Threshold-driven models and game theory are two fundamental paradigms for describing human interactions in social systems. However, in mimicking social contagion processes, models that simultaneously incorporate these two mechanisms have…

Social norms can facilitate societal coexistence in groups by providing an implicitly shared set of expectations and behavioral guidelines. However, different social groups can hold different norms, and lacking an overarching normative…

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…

A social norm defines what is good and what is bad in social contexts, as well as what to do based on such assessments. A stable social norm should be maintained against errors committed by its players. In addition, individuals may have…

By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…

The Naming Games (NG) are agent-based models for agreement dynamics, peer pressure and herding in social networks, and protocol selection in autonomous ad-hoc sensor networks. By introducing a small noise term to the NG, the resulting…

Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…

Costly punishment has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in one-shot games. However, recent studies have revealed that the effectiveness of costly punishment can be diminished by second-order free riders (i.e.,…

Uniform punishment policies can sustain cooperation in social dilemmas but impose severe costs on enforcers, creating a second-order free-rider problem that undermines the very mechanism designed to prevent exploitation. We show that the…

Cooperation in evolutionary biology means paying a cost, c, to enjoy benefits, b. A defector is one who does not pay any cost but enjoys the benefits of cooperators. Human societies, especially, have evolved a strategy to discourage…

Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the…

We introduce a homogeneous pair approximation to the Naming Game (NG) model by deriving a six-dimensional ODE for the two-word Naming Game. Our ODE reveals the change in dynamical behavior of the Naming Game as a function of the average…

Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and…

We consider the problem of influence maximization in fixed networks for contagion models in an adversarial setting. The goal is to select an optimal set of nodes to seed the influence process, such that the number of influenced nodes at the…

The "War of Attrition" is a classical game theoretic model that was first introduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a…

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…