理论经济学
This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…
We critique the formulation of Arrow's no-dictator condition to show that it does not correspond to the accepted informal/intuitive interpretation. This has implications for the theorem's scope of applicability.
We study the stochastic structure of cryptocurrency rates of returns as compared to stock returns by focusing on the associated cross-sectional distributions. We build two datasets. The first comprises forty-six major cryptocurrencies, and…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
The axiomatic foundations of Bentham and Rawls solutions are discussed within the broader domain of cardinal preferences. It is unveiled that both solution concepts share all four of the following axioms: Nonemptiness, Anonymity, Unanimity,…
We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium and emission tax equilibrium. The government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, then refrains from further action. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission…
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they…
This paper studies sequential information acquisition by an ambiguity-averse decision maker (DM), who decides how long to collect information before taking an irreversible action. The agent optimizes against the worst-case belief and…
We present a new proof for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, which involves no fixed point theorem. The self-contained proof consists of two parts. The first part introduces the notions of root function and pre-equilibrium. The second…
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a correspondence taking values in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space to be open so as to revisit the pioneering work of Schmeidler (1969), Shafer (1974), Shafer-Sonnenschein (1975) and…
How should authorities that care about match quality and diversity allocate resources when they are uncertain about the market? We introduce adaptive priority mechanisms (APM) that prioritize agents based on both their scores and…
We prove that when individual firms employ constant-returns-to-scale production functions, the aggregate production function defined by the maximum achievable total output given total inputs is always linear on some part of the domain. Our…
This paper introduces a unified framework called cooperative extensive form games, which (i) generalizes standard non-cooperative games, and (ii) allows for more complex coalition formation dynamics than previous concepts like…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
A great deal of empirical research has examined who falls for misinformation and why. Here, we introduce a formal game-theoretic model of engagement with news stories that captures the strategic interplay between (mis)information consumers…
In classical contract theory, we usually impose two assumptions: delegated contracts and perfect commitment. While the second assumption is demanding, the first one suffers no loss of generality. Following this tradition, current…
I introduce a favor exchange model where favors are substitutable and study bilateral enforcement of cooperation. Without substitutability, the value of a relationship does not depend on the rest of the network, and in equilibrium there is…
In this paper, we consider an environment in which the utilitarian theorem for the NM utility function derived by Harsanyi and the utilitarian theorem for Alt's utility function derived by Harvey hold simultaneously, and prove that the NM…
We introduce a generalization of the concept of sufficientarianism, intended to rank allocations involving multiple consumption goods. In ranking allocations of goods for a fixed society of agents, sufficientarianism posits that allocations…
We develop a tractable model for studying strategic interactions between learning algorithms. We uncover a mechanism responsible for the emergence of algorithmic collusion. We observe that algorithms periodically coordinate on actions that…