理论经济学
If Economics is understood as the study of the interactions among intentional agents, being rationality the main source of intentional behavior, the mathematical tools that it requires must be extended to capture systemic effects. Here we…
This paper extends Xing's (2023abcd) optimal growth models of catching-up economies from the case of production function switching to that of economic structure switching and argues how a country develops its economy by endogenous…
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
We give a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. We construct two topological spaces: one for the space of preference profiles and another for the space of outcomes. We show that social choice functions induce continuous mappings…
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
Despite its importance, relatively little attention has been devoted to studying the effects of exposing individuals to digital choice interfaces. In two pre-registered lottery-choice experiments, we administer three information-search…
Systems and blockchains often have security vulnerabilities and can be attacked by adversaries, with potentially significant negative consequences. Therefore, infrastructure providers increasingly rely on bug bounty programs, where external…
In school choice problems, the motivation for students' welfare (efficiency) is restrained by concerns to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among the fair matchings, even the best one in terms of welfare (SOSM) is inefficient.…
Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of…
An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We…
Studying intra-industry trade involves theoretical explanations and empirical methods to measure the phenomenon. Indicators have been developed to measure the intensity of intra-industry trade, leading to theoretical models explaining its…
Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…
Online platforms collect rich information about participants and then share some of this information back with them to improve market outcomes. In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in two-sided markets: If a…
A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who chooses what quality to supply and may erase its records at a low…
A group of agents each exert effort to produce a joint output, with the complementarities between their efforts represented by a (weighted) network. Under equity compensation, a principal motivates the agents to work by giving them shares…
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We introduce a definition of multivariate majorization that is new to the economics literature. Our majorization technique allows us to generalize Mussa and Rosen's (1978) "ironing" to a broad class of multivariate principal-agents…