理论经济学

I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own…

This paper presents a theoretical model of an autocrat who controls the media in an attempt to persuade society of his competence. We base our analysis on a Bayesian persuasion framework in which citizens have heterogeneous preferences and…

In a New Keynesian model where the trade-off between stabilising the aggregate inflation rate and the output gap arises from sectoral asymmetries, the gains from commitment are either zero or negligible. Thus, to the extent that economic…

We propose a restrictiveness measure for economic models based on how well they fit synthetic data from a pre-defined class. This measure, together with a measure for how well the model fits real data, outlines a Pareto frontier, where…

Coordination facilitation and efficient decision-making are two essential components of successful leadership. In this paper, we take an informational approach and investigate how followers' information impacts coordination and efficient…

In this paper, I prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a large class of games with nonconvex strategy spaces. Specifically, if each player's strategies form a compact, connected Euclidean neighborhood retract and if…

Individuals use models to guide decisions, but many models are wrong. This paper studies which misspecified models are likely to persist when individuals also entertain alternative models. Consider an agent who uses her model to learn the…

In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of…

This paper establishes a link between endowments, patience types, and the parameters of the HARA Bernoulli utility function that ensure equilibrium uniqueness in an economy with two goods and two impatience types with additive separable…

We examine how uncertain veracity of external news influences investor beliefs, market prices and corporate disclosures. Despite assuming independence between the news' veracity and the firm's endowment with private information, we find…

In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the…

This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…

I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. Task allocation and workers' motivation interact through the organization's promotion decisions. The organization designs the workers'…

We establish the Subgradient Theorem for monotone correspondences -- a monotone correspondence is equal to the subdifferential of a potential if and only if it is conservative, i.e. its integral along a closed path vanishes irrespective of…

This paper examines the relationship between resource reallocation, uniqueness of equilibrium and efficiency in economics. We explore the implications of reallocation policies for stability, conflict, and decision-making by analysing the…

Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…

In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…

We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…

Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…

We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct…