理论经济学
We propose a distributionally robust principal agent formulation, which generalizes some common variants of worst-case and Bayesian principal agent problems. We construct a theoretical framework to certify whether any surjective contract…
The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) ensures that the revealed preference (i) is a preference relation (i.e., it is complete and transitive) and (ii) rationalizes the choices. However, when WARP fails, either one of these two…
In this paper, we provide an example of the optimal growth model in which there exist infinitely many solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation but the value function does not satisfy this equation. We consider the cause of this…
Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The…
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to distinguish attacks from legitimate competition among honest users for having their transactions included earlier in the block. We also use it to…
We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear,…
We compare two scenarios in a model where politicians offer local public goods to heterogeneous voters: one where politicians have access to data on voters and thus can target specific ones, and another where politicians only decide on the…
We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a…
Given a player is guaranteed the same payoff for each delivery path in a single-cube delivery network, the player's best response is to randomly divide all goods and deliver them to all other nodes, and the best response satisfies the…
This paper studies a sequential decision problem where payoff distributions are known and where the riskiness of payoffs matters. Equivalently, it studies sequential choice from a repeated set of independent lotteries. The decision-maker is…
We study the problem of screening in decision-making processes under uncertainty, focusing on the impact of adding an additional screening stage, commonly known as a 'gatekeeper.' While our primary analysis is rooted in the context of job…
India has enacted an intricate affirmative action program through a reservation system since the 1950s. Notably, in 2008, a historic judgment by the Supreme Court of India (SCI) in the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India mandated…
Industries learn productivity improvements from their suppliers. The observed empirical importance of these interactions, often omitted by input-output models, mandates larger attention. This article embeds interdependent total factor…
Ethereum is undergoing significant changes to its architecture as it evolves. These changes include its switch to PoS consensus and the introduction of significant infrastructural changes that do not require a change to the core protocol,…
The over-and-above choice rule is the prominent selection procedure to implement affirmative action. In India, it is legally mandated to allocate public school seats and government job positions. This paper presents an axiomatic…
In this note, I introduce Estimated Performance Rating (PR$^e$), a novel system for evaluating player performance in sports and games. PR$^e$ addresses a key limitation of the Tournament Performance Rating (TPR) system, which is undefined…
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering,…
In mechanism design theory, agents' types are described as their private information, and the designer may reveal some public information to affect agents' types in order to obtain more payoffs. Traditionally, each agent's private type and…
The Market for Lemons is a classic model of asymmetric information first studied by Nobel Prize economist George Akerlof. It shows that information asymmetry between the seller and buyer may result in market collapse or some sellers leaving…
We present a framework for analyzing the near miss effect in lotteries. A decision maker (DM) facing a lottery, falsely interprets losing outcomes that are close to winning ones, as a sign that success is within reach. As a result of this…