理论经济学
We develop a model of wishful thinking that incorporates the costs and benefits of biased beliefs. We establish the connection between distorted beliefs and risk, revealing how wishful thinking can be understood in terms of risk measures.…
We propose a framework to assess how to optimally sort and grade students of heterogenous ability. Potential employers face uncertainty regarding an individual's productive value. Knowing which school an individual went to is useful for two…
We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we find that the effort of…
We study the management of product transitions in a semiconductor manufacturing firm that requires the coordination of resource allocation decisions by multiple, autonomous Product Divisions using a multi-follower bilevel model to capture…
A principal provides nondiscriminatory incentives for independent and identical agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown, very generally, that any…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
Ecosystems enjoy increasing attention due to their flexibility and innovative power. It is well known, however, that this type of network-based economic governance structures occupies a potentially unstable position between the two stable…
Artificial-intelligence tools in research like ChatGPT are playing an increasingly transformative role in revolutionizing scientific publishing and re-shaping its economic background. They can help academics to tackle such issues as limited…
When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political…
We consider finite information structures, and quest for the answer of the question: What is the proper definition of prior? In the single player setting we conclude that a probability distribution is a prior if it is disintegrable, because…
In this paper we extend the study of Arrow's generalisation of Black's single-peaked domain and connect this to domains where voting rules satisfy different versions of independence of irrelevant alternatives. First we report on a…
This paper presents a method for incorporating risk aversion into existing decision tree models used in economic evaluations. The method involves applying a probability weighting function based on rank dependent utility theory to reduced…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users'…
We show that it is possible to understand and identify a decision maker's subjective causal judgements by observing her preferences over interventions. Following Pearl [2000], we represent causality using causal models (also called…
We examine the statistical properties of a closed monetary economy with multi-aggregates interactions. Building upon Yakovenko's single-agent monetary model (Dragulescu and Yakovenko, 2000), we investigate the joint equilibrium distribution…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
This paper characterizes the conditions under which the observed beliefs of a group of agents are consistent with Bayesian updating. Beliefs are consistent with Bayesianism if they arise from the application of Bayes' rule given some…
We study the dynamics of opinions in a setting where a leader has a payoff that depends on agents' beliefs and where agents derive psychological utility from their beliefs. Agents sample a signal that maximises their utility and then…
We have used agent-based modeling as our numerical method to artificially simulate a dynamic real economy where agents are rational maximizers of an objective function of Cobb-Douglas type. The economy is characterised by heterogeneous…