理论经济学

We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their…

In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that…

We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members'…

This paper studies how violations of structural assumptions like expected utility and exponential discounting can be connected to basic rationality violations, even though these assumptions are typically regarded as independent building…

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…

We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…

We present a general equilibrium macro-finance model with a positive feedback loop between capital investment and land price. As leverage is relaxed beyond a critical value, through the financial accelerator, a phase transition occurs from…

We study a general class of consumption-savings problems with recursive preferences. We characterize the sign of the consumption response to arbitrary shocks in terms of the product of two sufficient statistics: the elasticity of…

Let $\precsim$ be a reflexive binary relation on a topological space $(X, \tau )$. A pair $(u,v)$ of continuous real-valued functions on $(X, \tau )$ is said to be a {\em continuous representation} of $\precsim$ if, for all $x,y \in X$,…

We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms…

A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…

An agenda-setter repeatedly proposes a spatial policy to voters until some proposal is accepted. Voters have distinct but correlated preferences and receive private signals about the common state. I investigate whether the agenda-setter…

An informed planner wishes to spread information among a group of agents in order to induce efficient coordination -- say the adoption of a new technology with positive externalities. The agents are connected via a social network. The…

We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio and perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup,…

In this paper, we derive a formula for the present value of future consumer goods multiplier based on the assumption that a constant share of investment in the production of consumer goods is expected. The present value appears to be an…

As one of the most fundamental concepts in transportation science, Wardrop equilibrium (WE) has always had a relatively weak behavioral underpinning. To strengthen this foundation, one must reckon with bounded rationality in human…

We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…

We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…

What is the optimal order in which a researcher should submit their papers to journals of differing quality? I analyze a sequential search model without recall where the researcher's expected value from journal submission depends on the…

In this paper we focus our efforts on studying how a preorder and topology can be made compatible. Thus we provide a characterization of those that are continuous-compatible. Such a characterization states that such topologies must be finer…