理论经济学
This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in an economy with production and a continuum of consumers, each of whose incomplete and price-dependent preferences are defined on commodities they may consider deleterious, bads which…
An agent observes a clue, and an analyst observes an inference: a ranking of events on the basis of how corroborated they are by the clue. We prove that if the inference satisfies the axioms of Villegas (1964) except for the classic…
This paper develops a unified game-theoretic account of how generative AI reshapes the pre-doctoral "hope-labor" market linking Principal Investigators (PIs), Research Assistants (RAs), and PhD admissions. We integrate (i) a PI-RA…
We study optimal taxation when citizens hold beliefs about an honest versus opportunistic government and update those beliefs from observed taxes and delivery. In a Ramsey economy with competitive firms, the government privately knows its…
We study sequential social learning with continuous actions and conformity when agents can endogenously generate hard, publicly verifiable evidence. Actions transmit soft information whose visibility depends on responsiveness to private…
In this note, we introduce a novel performance rating system called Performance Rating Equilibrium (PRE). A PRE is a vector of ratings for each player, such that if these ratings were each player's initial rating at the start of a…
We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame --…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
E-commerce platforms are rolling out ambitious targeted advertising initiatives that rely on merchants sharing customer data with each other via the platform. Yet current platform designs fail to address participating merchants' concerns…
In this paper we provide a good overview of the problems and the background of mathematics education in Syrian schools. We aimed to study the effect of using popular mathematical puzzles on the mathematical thinking of schoolchildren, by…
We provide an axiomatic characterization of lexicographic preferences over the set of all random availability functions using two assumptions. The first assumption is strong monotonicity, which in our framework is equivalent to the strong…
We study a model of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) in a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari framework with heterogeneous agents. The model is set in continuous time, and ex post heterogeneity arises due to idiosyncratic, uninsurable income…
We show that in the context of exchange economies defined by aggregate excess demand functions on the full open price simplex, the generic economy has a finite number of equilibria. Genericicity is proved also for critical economies and, in…
We study the problem of measuring the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms and the ensuing methods to compensate them (from the revenues platforms raise by charging users). We uncover the space of popularity indices upon…
We study education as a remedy for misspecified beliefs in a canonical sequential social-learning model. Uneducated agents misinterpret action histories - treating actions as if they were independent signals and, potentially, overstating…
We study the problem of allocating the revenues raised via paid subscriptions to music streaming platforms among participating artists. We show that the main methods to solve streaming problems (pro-rata, user-centric and families…
We study an index to measure the popularity of artists in music streaming platforms. This index, which can be used to allocate the amount raised via paid subscriptions among participating artists, is based on the Shapley value, a…