理论经济学
This paper introduces a geometric framework for analyzing power relations in games, independent of their strategic form. We define a canonical preference space where each player's relational stance is a normalized vector. This model…
The usual formulas for the fair market valuation of a firm at time $t$ include the profits accruing to the shares at time $t$ from the use of wage or salaried labor in the future. But in employee-owned firms or partnerships, the future…
We axiomatize the Choquet rank-dependent utility model within a Savage framework with an exogenous source of pure risk. This model is a decision model under ambiguity, serving as a conceptual generalization of the Choquet expected utility…
We study how social image concerns shape information sharing among peers. Individuals receive a signal about a binary state of the world characterized by both a direction and a veracity status. While the direction is freely observable,…
This paper studies how improved monitoring affects the limit equilibrium payoff set for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We introduce a simple generalization of Blackwell garbling called weighted garbling in order to…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of…
This paper introduces a framework for modeling the cost of information acquisition based on the principle of cost-minimization. We study the reduced-form \emph{indirect cost} of information generated by the sequential minimization of a…
We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to each player's stand-alone worth. Focusing on fixed-population consistency, we characterize the proportional division…
A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…
We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated and how regulation should evolve with new information. An adaptive sandbox comprising a zero marginal tax up to an evolving quantity limit is (i) robust: it delivers optimal…
We study the classical probabilistic assignment problem, where finitely many indivisible objects are to be probabilistically or proportionally assigned among an equal number of agents. Each agent has an initial deterministic endowment and a…
We propose a model of cross-pollination among online social media (OSM) websites, where the dynamics of user interactions mimic insect-mediated pollen transfer by pollinators. A pollinator acts as a vehicle enabling users to visit multiple…
To choose between two discrete goods, a consumer pays attention to only those with prices below a threshold. From these, she chooses her most preferred good. We assume consumers in a population have the same preference but may have…
There is no known explicit global closed form solution for the standard income fluctuation problem with a borrowing constraint and where wealth accumulates with a constant interest rate $r$. Using a continuous time formulation, I derive an…
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's…
Blockchains face inherent limitations when communicating outside their own ecosystem, largely due to the Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) 3f+1 security model. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a promising mitigation because they allow…
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but…
A firm can complete the tasks needed to produce output using either machines or workers. Unlike machines, workers have private information about their preferences over tasks. I study how this information asymmetry shapes the mechanism used…
This paper uses Nash equilibrium reversion as an optimal tool for clearing dynamic prices and wages. Various exogenous competitive rigidities determine the balanced growth path of the efficiency wage and the outcome of repeated…