理论经济学
We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from subscriptions to music streaming platforms among content providers. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for two focal (and somewhat polar) methods widely…
This paper covers a variety of mathematical folk puzzles, including geometric (Tangrams, dissection puzzles), logic, algebraic, probability (Monty Hall Problem, Birthday Paradox), and combinatorial challenges (Eight Queens Puzzle, Tower of…
The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from…
This paper offers a proof of the Coase theorem by formalizing the notion of ideal exchanges.
New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…
In this paper, I develop a refinement of stability for matching markets with incomplete information. I introduce Information-Credible Pairwise Stability (ICPS), a solution concept in which deviating pairs can use credible, costly tests to…
Our infrastructure systems enable our well-being by allowing us to move, store, and transform materials and information given considerable social and environmental variation. Critically, this ability is shaped by the degree to which society…
Rejections of positive offers in the Ultimatum Game have been attributed to different motivations. We show that a model combining social preferences and moral concerns provides a unifying explanation for these rejections while accounting…
We analyze a two-period, two-market chain-store game in which an incumbent's conduct in one market is only sometimes seen in the other. This partial observability generates reputational spillovers across markets. We characterize equilibrium…
We study learning in complete-information games, allowing the players' models of their environment to be misspecified. We introduce Berk--Nash rationalizability: the largest self-justified set of actions -- meaning each action in the set is…
This paper studies a monopolist selling multiple goods to a consumer with one-dimensional private types. I provide a sufficient condition under which the monopolist's problem is equivalent to finding the upper envelope of the marginal…
I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably…
In this paper, I formalize intelligence measurement in games by introducing mechanisms that assign a real number -- interpreted as an intelligence score -- to each player in a game. This score quantifies the ex-post strategic ability of the…
We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with \emph{discrete} types by offering a menu of \emph{discrete} quantities and \emph{discrete} transfers. We assume that the principal's valuation is discrete strictly concave and use a…
We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some types of the agent may have an incentive to raise the…
We introduce convex function intervals (CFIs): families of convex functions satisfying given level and slope constraints. CFIs naturally arise as constraint sets in economic design, including problems with type-dependent participation…
We study blockchain trade-intent auctions, which currently intermediate about USD 10 billion in trades each month. These auctions are combinatorial because executing multiple trade intents jointly generates additional efficiencies. However,…
As e-commerce marketplaces continue to grow in popularity, it has become increasingly important to understand the role and impact of marketplace operators on competition and social welfare. We model a marketplace operator as an entity that…
We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transfers, such as monopoly pricing, principal-optimal bilateral…