理论经济学
This paper characterizes the set of feasible posterior distributions subject to graph-based inferential privacy constraint, including both differential and inferential privacy. This characterization can be done through enumerating all…
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of apportionment where the groups form a hierarchical structure,…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
We study how school choice mechanisms shape wealth segregation in the long term by endogenizing residential choice. Families buy houses in school zones that determine admission priority, experience shocks to school preferences, and…
We study evolutionary dynamics in which firms endogenously revise the behavioral rules that govern strategy revisions in symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Specifically, we consider two principles that guide rule revision, No-Birth and…
Implementation theory has made significant advances in characterizing which social choice functions can be implemented in Nash equilibrium, but these results typically assume sophisticated strategic reasoning by agents. However, evidence…
When does Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finitely many actions and states, we establish that, generically, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal.…
This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…
This paper studies incomplete-information games in which an information provider, an oracle, publicly discloses information to the players. One oracle is said to dominate another if, in every game, it can replicate the equilibrium outcomes…
We examine information structures in settings with privately informed agents and an informationally constrained mediator who supplies additional public signals. Our focus is on characterizing the set of posteriors that the mediator can…
We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability increasing in the expert's reputation; outcomes, when realized,…
Neoclassical economic theory presents marginal productivity (MP) theory using the scalar notion of marginal products, and takes pains, implicitly or explicitly, to show that competitive equilibrium satisfies the supposedly ethical…
We study linguistic indirectness when speakers attend to social ties. Social ties are modeled by a graph, and conferences are the sets of nodes that hear a message. Conference worth is a distance polynomial on the graph; allocations are…
This paper focuses on assessing the potential of micro-credentials in digitalized higher education in the era of artificial intelligence. Micro-credentials are commonly described as mini qualifications or digital badges that certify an…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime's true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens' private signals. Each citizen then decides…
We study an overlapping-generations model of community enforcement where each agent interacts once as young and once as old across two groups. After each match a minimal, directed record assigns a public "stigma" only when a player defects…
I study whether and which expert incentives can be provided at what cost when the states of the world become non-contractible, but there is some noisy observation about the states that can be contracted upon. A principal hires an agent to…
This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…
This review paper focuses on enhancing organizational economic sustainability through process optimization and human capital effective management utilizing the soft systems methodology (SSM) approach which offers a holistic approach for…