理论经济学

We study how a principal can jointly shape an agent's timing and action through information. We develop a revelation principle: with intertemporal commitment, the problem simplifies to choosing a joint distribution over stopping times and…

I revisit the standard moral-hazard model, in which an agent's preference over contracts is rooted in costly effort choice. I characterise the behavioural content of the model in terms of empirically testable axioms, and show that the…

We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very…

In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…

We set out to solve a dual puzzle regarding reproductive strategies: The "Ancient vs. Modern" Puzzle (why pre-modern elites adopted a "Survival" strategy while modern elites adopt an "Anxiety" strategy) and the "Class Divide" Puzzle (why…

We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifiably disclose to a receiver. The receiver does not know how…

This paper studies choice situations in which a decision maker can choose multiple alternatives. Given a menu of available options, the decision maker selects a subset of the menu with certain probabilities. We employ an axiomatic approach…

We identify a distinct motive for search, termed catalytic exploration, where agents rationally explore alternatives they expect to reject to resolve uncertainty about the status quo. By decomposing option value into switching and catalytic…

We study a dynamic labor market in which a risk-averse worker with career concerns chooses each period between self-employment, which generates publicly observed binary output, and employment at a firm, which pays a flat wage but keeps…

We develop a general framework for reserve systems that allocate scarce resources such as vaccines to unit-demand agents under prioritization and eligibility constraints, along with a computationally efficient mechanism. Reserve systems…

This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how…

In this paper I propose a micro-based innovation driven general equilibrium growth-model allowing for endogenous entry and exit as well as three different types of research. I make the novel distinction between three types of firms, namely…

We model the cadence of AI product releases, i.e. quiet spells, reversible patches, and rarer pivots, as optimal exercise of strategic real options under reputational learning. A privately observed technical state follows a diffusion. The…

Businesses often react to external events by sending pro-social messages on social media that show the sender's alignment with the underlying prosocial cause and enhance their brand image. Consumers are uncertain about the authenticity of…

We present the Pioneer Detection Method, a supervisory tool we developed to enhance resilience in insurance markets facing the challenges posed by climate change. Based on a theoretical model of the insurance industry, we consider a…

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…

We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…

A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for…

In this paper, I propose a new framework for representing multidimensional incomplete preferences through zonotope-valued utilities, addressing the shortcomings of traditional scalar and vector-based models in decision theory. Traditional…

This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets…