计算机科学与博弈论
Tradable credit schemes (TCS) have been attracting interest from the transportation research community as an appealing alternative to congestion pricing, due to the advantages of revenue neutrality and equity. Nonetheless, existing research…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a form of citizen participation that allows citizens to decide how public funds are spent. Through an election, citizens express their preferences on various projects (spending proposals). A voting mechanism…
Many real-world multi-agent or multi-task evaluation scenarios can be naturally modelled as normal-form games due to inherent strategic (adversarial, cooperative, and mixed motive) interactions. These strategic interactions may be agentic…
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…
As the next-generation Internet paradigm, the metaverse can provide users with immersive physical-virtual experiences without spatial limitations. However, there are various concerns to be overcome, such as resource allocation, resource…
Universities regularly face the challenging task of assigning classes to thousands of students while considering their preferences, along with course schedules and capacities. Ensuring the effectiveness and fairness of course allocation…
Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) interleaves empirical game-theoretic analysis with deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to solve games too complex for traditional analytic methods. Tree-exploiting PSRO (TE-PSRO) is a variant of this…
Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…
T\^atonnement is a simple, intuitive market process where prices are iteratively adjusted based on the difference between demand and supply. Many variants under different market assumptions have been studied and shown to converge to a…
We consider a truthful facility location problem in which there is a set of agents with private locations on the line of real numbers, and the goal is to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those…
We initiate the study of multidimensional Bayesian utility maximization, focusing on the unit-demand setting where values are i.i.d. across both items and buyers. The seminal result of Hartline and Roughgarden '08 studies simple,…
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…
This paper considers an online multi-player resource-sharing game with bandit feedback. Multiple players choose from a finite collection of resources in a time slotted system. In each time slot, each resource brings a random reward that is…
Although synergy is an important concept that is strongly ingrained in games, it has not been widely discussed by the games community. This is due to the vagueness of the concept and the fact that there is no clear agreement on what it…
Recent advancements in intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRS) and mobile edge computing (MEC) offer new opportunities to enhance the performance of vehicular networks. However, meeting the computation-intensive and latency-sensitive demands…
We show that the proportional clustering problem using the Droop quota for $k = 1$ is equivalent to the $\beta$-plurality problem. We also show that the Plurality Veto rule can be used to select ($\sqrt{5} - 2$)-plurality points using only…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
First-price auctions are one of the most popular mechanisms for selling goods and services, with applications ranging from display advertising to timber sales. Unlike their close cousin, the second-price auction, first-price auctions do not…
We study the problem of "fairly" dividing indivisible goods to several agents that have valuation set functions over the sets of goods. As fair we consider the allocations that are envy-free up to any good (EFX), i.e., no agent envies any…
Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…