计算机科学与博弈论

Differentiable economics -- the use of deep learning for auction design -- has driven progress in the automated design of multi-item auctions with additive or unit-demand valuations. However, little progress has been made for optimal…

We study Walrasian economies (or general equilibrium models) and their solution concept, the Walrasian equilibrium. A key challenge in this domain is identifying price-adjustment processes that converge to equilibrium. One such process,…

Agents in mixed-motive coordination problems such as Chicken may fail to coordinate on a Pareto-efficient outcome. Safe Pareto improvements (SPIs) were originally proposed to mitigate miscoordination in cases where players lack…

We introduce the Byzantine Selection Problem, living at the intersection of game theory and fault-tolerant distributed computing. Here, an event organizer is presented with a group of $n$ agents, and wants to select $\ell < n$ of them to…

The Facility Location Problem (FLP) is a well-studied optimization problem with applications in many real-world scenarios. Past literature has explored the solutions from different perspectives to tackle FLPs. These include investigating…

We consider voting on multiple independent binary issues. In addition, a weighting vector for each voter defines how important they consider each issue. The most natural way to aggregate the votes into a single unified proposal is…

We consider a one-sided matching problem where agents who are partitioned into disjoint classes and each class must receive fair treatment in a desired matching. This model, proposed by Benabbou et al. [2019], aims to address various…

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…

We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021], in which the agent's type is described by a single…

We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows…

In the empirical approach to game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the model of the game comes not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural description of the game environment. The motivation for developing…

We study a \emph{financial} version of the classic online problem of scheduling weighted packets with deadlines. The main novelty is that, while previous works assume packets have \emph{fixed} weights throughout their lifetime, this work…

Online platforms such as YouTube, Instagram heavily rely on recommender systems to decide what content to present to users. Producers, in turn, often create content that is likely to be recommended to users and have users engage with it. To…

In games with imperfect recall, players may forget the sequence of decisions they made in the past. When players also forget whether they have already encountered their current decision point, they are said to be absent-minded. Solving…

Hedonic games model settings in which a set of agents have to be partitioned into groups which we call coalitions. In the enemy aversion model, each agent has friends and enemies, and an agent prefers to be in a coalition with as few…

We study a fair division problem in (multi)graphs where $n$ agents (vertices) are pairwise connected by items (edges), and each agent is only interested in its incident items. We consider how to allocate items to incident agents in an…

We consider fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents of equal entitlements, with submodular valuation functions. Previously, Seddighin and Seddighin [{\em Artificial Intelligence} 2024] proved the existence of allocations that…

Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit…

Schelling games use a game-theoretic approach to study the phenomenon of residential segregation as originally modeled by Schelling. Inspired by the recent increase in the number of people and businesses preferring and promoting diversity,…

To achieve common goals, we often use joint commitments. Our commitment helps us to coordinate with our partners and assures them that their cooperative efforts will benefit themselves. However, if one of us can exploit the other's…