计算机科学与博弈论

In this paper, we study cooperation in distributed games under network-constrained communication. Building on the framework of Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999), we derive a sufficient condition for cooperative equilibrium in settings where…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…

We establish a compatibility between fairness and efficiency, captured via Nash Social Welfare (NSW), under the broad class of subadditive valuations. We prove that, for subadditive valuations, there always exists a partial allocation that…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

We study a model of subscription-based platforms where users pay a fixed fee for unlimited access to content, and creators receive a share of the revenue. Existing approaches to detecting fraud predominantly rely on machine learning…

We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables constitute an important class of games in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem, where both the objective and the feasible set is parameterized by…

In many real-life settings, algorithms play the role of assistants, while humans ultimately make the final decision. Often, algorithms specifically act as curators, narrowing down a wide range of options into a smaller subset that the human…

Learning and computation of equilibria are central problems in game theory, theory of computation, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we introduce proximal regret, a new notion of regret based on proximal operators that lies…

We study the problem of allocating items to agents with submodular valuations with the goal of maximizing the weighted Nash social welfare (NSW). The best-known results for unweighted and weighted objectives are the $(4+\epsilon)$…

No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…

Human interactions are influenced by emotions, temperament, and affection, often conflicting with individuals' underlying preferences. Without explicit knowledge of those preferences, judging whether behaviour is appropriate becomes…

We study the problem of assigning items to agents so as to maximize the \emph{weighted} Nash Social Welfare (NSW) under submodular valuations. The best-known result for the problem is an $O(nw_{\max})$-approximation due to Garg, Husic, Li,…

Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are…

We propose a method for solving parity games with acyclic (DAG) sub-structures by computing nested fixpoints of a DAG attractor function that lives over the non-DAG parts of the game, thereby restricting the domain of the involved fixpoint…

We investigate first-order notions of correlated equilibria in smooth games, in which players do not incur any regret against small modifications of their actions prescribed by some vector field. We define two such notions, based on local…

We study the welfare of a mechanism in a dynamic environment where a learning investor can make a costly investment to change her value. In many real-world problems, the common assumption that the investor always makes the best responses,…