计算机科学与博弈论

Rigorous valuation of individual data sources is critical for fair compensation in data markets, informed data acquisition, and transparent development of ML/AI models. Classical Data Shapley (DS) provides a essential axiomatic framework…

This paper investigates the impact of perturbations on the best-response-based algorithms approximating Nash equilibria in zero-sum games, namely Double Oracle and Fictitious Play. More precisely, we assume that the oracle computing the…

We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum Colonel Blotto games in which, after allocating soldiers across battlefields, players engage in (possibly distinct) normal-form games on each battlefield. Per-battlefield payoffs are parameterized by…

Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…

Data valuation methods assign marginal utility to each data point that has contributed to the training of a machine learning model. If used directly as a payout mechanism, this creates a hidden cost of valuation, in which contributors with…

Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…

Markov games and robust MDPs are closely related models that involve computing a pair of saddle point policies. As part of the long-standing effort to develop efficient algorithms for these models, the Filar-Tolwinski (FT) algorithm has…

Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…

The Pandora's Box problem models the search for the best alternative when evaluation is costly. In the simplest variant, a decision maker is presented with $n$ boxes, each associated with a cost of inspection and a hidden random reward. The…

PinFi is a class of novel protocols for decentralized pricing of dissipative assets, whose value naturally declines over time. Central to the protocol's functionality and its market efficiency is the role of liquidity providers (LPs). This…

We extend the seminal model of Pathak and S\"onmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two districts. In our setting, in addition to each student…

In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…

We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. Users control infinitesimal flow particles aiming to travel from an origin to a destination as quickly as possible. Flow patterns vary over…

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this…

In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph,…

We study the recently introduced fair division concept of the happy nucleolus for cost allocation among players in a cooperative game, with special focus on its computation. The happy nucleolus applies the same fairness criterion as the…

We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…

We present a novel framework for {\epsilon}-optimally solving two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs). These games pose a major challenge due to the absence of a principled connection with dynamic programming…

Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed…