计算机科学与博弈论

Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=6 or larger. We answer it positively for the remaining case…

Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…

The progressive second-price auction of Lazar and Semret is a decentralized mechanism for the allocation and real-time pricing of a divisible resource. Our focus is on how delays in the receipt of bid messages, asynchronous analysis by…

Citizens' assemblies - small panels of citizens that convene to deliberate on policy issues - often face the issue of panelists dropping out at the last-minute. Without intervention, these dropouts compromise the size and representativeness…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

A safe Pareto improvement (SPI) [41] is a modification of a game that leaves all players better off with certainty. SPIs are typically proven under qualitative assumptions about the way different games are played. For example, we assume…

For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Cs\'oka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent mechanisms. The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism with transfers (TU-GUM) implements efficiency in a…

Researchers strategically choose where to submit their work in order to maximize its impact, and these publication decisions in turn determine venues' impact factors. To analyze how individual publication choices both respond to and shape…

The assignment game is a classical model for profit sharing and a cornerstone of cooperative game theory. While an imputation in its core guarantees fairness among coalitions, it provides no fairness guarantee at the level of individual…

We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…

In this paper, we propose fast pseudo-polynomial-time algorithms for computing power indices in weighted majority games. We show that we can compute the Banzhaf index for all players in $O(n+q\log (q))$ time, where $n$ is the number of…

Efficient coordination in multi-agent systems often incurs high communication overhead or slow convergence rates, making scalable welfare optimization difficult. We propose Single-Bit Coordination Dynamics for Pareto-Efficient Outcomes…

Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance guarantees when the prediction is perfect (consistency), while…

Training data is the backbone of large language models (LLMs), yet today's data markets often operate under exploitative pricing -- sourcing data from marginalized groups with little pay or recognition. This paper introduces a theoretical…

As data emerges as a vital driver of technological and economic advancements, a key challenge is accurately quantifying its value in algorithmic decision-making. The Shapley value, a well-established concept from cooperative game theory,…

The sequence form, owing to its compact and holistic strategy representation, has demonstrated significant efficiency in computing normal-form perfect equilibria for two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Nevertheless, the…

We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…

We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

We present a new algorithm that achieves a $\frac{7}{9}$-approximation for the maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible goods under additive valuations, improving the current best ratio of $\frac{10}{13}$ (Heidari et al., SODA 2026).…

Operating large autonomous fleets demands fast, resilient allocation of scarce resources (such as energy and fuel, charger access and maintenance slots, time windows, and communication bandwidth) under uncertainty. We propose a…