计算机科学与博弈论

We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee's diversity into account. One model aims to find a committee with maximal diversity given a scoring function (e.g. of…

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…

Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general $N$-player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cyclical or periodic behavior. Such cycles are fundamental…

Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face…

Standard models of bounded rationality typically assume agents either possess accurate knowledge of the population's reasoning abilities (Cognitive Hierarchy) or hold dogmatic, degenerate beliefs (Level-$k$). We introduce the ``Connected…

In this paper, we introduce a family of sequential decision-making problems, collectively termed the Keychain Problem, that involve exploring a set of actions to maximize expected payoff when only a subset of actions are available in each…

Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…

The utilitarian distortion framework evaluates voting rules by their worst-case efficiency loss when voters have cardinal utilities but express only ordinal rankings. Under the classical model, a longstanding tension exists: Plurality,…

Propagation latency is inherent to any distributed network, including blockchains. Typically, blockchain protocols provide a timing buffer for block propagation across the network. In leader-based blockchains, the leader -- block proposer…

Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

Kidney exchange programs among hospitals in the United States and across European countries improve efficiency by pooling donors and patients on a centralized platform. Sustaining such cooperation requires stability. When the core is empty,…

In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…

Consider an election where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must choose exactly one candidate to nominate for the election held over all nominees. The Necessary President problem asks whether a candidate, if…

Normal-form proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson as a refinement of normal-form perfect equilibrium, occupies a distinctive position in the equilibrium analysis of extensive-form games because its more stringent perturbation structure…

We study the pricing query complexity of revenue maximization for a single buyer whose private valuation is drawn from an unknown distribution. In this setting, the seller must learn the optimal monopoly price by posting prices and…

We study online fair allocation of $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences, with the objective of maximizing generalized-mean welfare, defined as the $p$-mean of agents' time-averaged utilities, with…

We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…

Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audited or communicated. We propose explainable information…

In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…