计算机科学与博弈论

Evolutionary game theory provides a framework by which to study the emergence of cooperation in a population of self-interested actors. In such a framework, players' decisions on whether or not to cooperate evolve according to decision…

We study a setting in which an algorithm must output a fair allocation of indivisible items while "learning on the job". More specifically, the algorithm is to output an allocation satisfying EF1, PROP1, or similar fairness notions;…

Data trading is a central approach to data circulation, yet data markets remain far less active than expected. A primary bottleneck is the lack of effective economic incentives. Existing approaches often treat data as traditional goods,…

Binary aggregation without verifiable ground truth arises when agents' reports must be aggregated without access to gold-standard labels. This paper studies a tunable reward--penalty mechanism for binary aggregation without verification.…

We study multi-unit multi-buyer auctions, where buyers are subject to constraints that affect their bidding strategy. These may take the form of \emph{bidding constraints} (e.g., no-overbidding, in cases where bids are partially…

Mechanism design increasingly faces heterogeneous environments containing both traditional utility maximizers and value maximizers, the latter of whom seek to maximize acquired value subject to Return-on-Spend constraints. Designing…

We study prophet inequalities with discounted rewards, where i.i.d. base rewards are multiplicatively discounted over time. Our main message is that even this structured and arbitrarily weak form of nonstationarity can erase the classical…

This paper introduces an original approach to an underexplored issue: the integration of a new member into an existing renewable energy community. The problem involves actions with both long-term consequences, such as investment and local…

Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithms guarantee sublinear regret for agents learning unknown stochastic environments, yet the same principle that makes them statistically efficient (optimism in the face of uncertainty) induces a…

We study the approval-based multiwinner election problem where a set of $n$ voters cast approval-based ballots to a set of $m$ candidates, and we are to select a winner committee consisting of $k$ candidates. We consider two axioms: strong…

We study the problem of forecasting for an arbitrary number of downstream agents with unknown objectives, each of whom best responds to the forecaster's predictions. We seek a single forecaster that guarantees sublinear swap regret for all…

Two-player games on graphs are a classical framework for analyzing strategic decision making. In turn-based games, two players move a token along the edges of the graph, and the right to move the token is determined by the current vertex.…

Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information. Existing approaches for computing Nash equilibrium, the central game-theoretic solution concept, in such games either lack scalability or obtain poor performance. In…

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate strategic interactions through natural language, making semantic control a critical element of communication and deception. This paper develops a semantic signaling game in which a sender…

We introduce the game changer problem, where an external designer modifies a game's reward matrix to make a target pure action profile the unique equilibrium, subject to the constraint that all entries of the reward matrix come from a…

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable…

This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games. We extend the Aumann-Shapley value and the Aumann-Dr\`eze value to coalition structures in which each coalition is treated as a…

The value problem for 2-player games on graph generally consists in determining the minimal value Min can ensure against any possible strategy for Max. We consider here the value problem for reachability objectives in weighted timed games…

Strategic behaviour in queueing systems has been studied extensively in the behavioural queueing literature, but almost exclusively for systems that admit closed-form expressions for the cost or utility experienced by a strategic user.…

In this paper, we study reactive strategies in repeated additive games between two players with finitely many actions. Reactive strategies condition only on the opponent's previous action, making them one of the simplest ways players can…