计算机科学与博弈论

We consider the matroid prophet inequality problem. This problem has been extensively studied in the case of adaptive mechanisms. In particular, there is a tight $2$-competitive mechanism for all matroids. However, it is not known what…

Motivated by the shortage of seats that the Chilean school choice system is facing, we introduce the problem of jointly increasing school capacities and finding a student-optimal assignment in the expanded market. Due to the theoretical and…

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…

Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on…

We consider two-player games over graphs and give tight bounds on the memory size of strategies ensuring safety objectives. More specifically, we show that the minimal number of memory states of a strategy ensuring a safety objective is…

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by Ghani et al. in 2018, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the notion of a game in…

We investigate the online fair allocation problem with sequentially arriving items under various input models, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. We propose the unconstrained PACE (Pacing According to Current Estimated…

Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over…

In ex ante coordinated adversarial team games (ATGs), a team competes against an adversary, and the team members are only allowed to coordinate their strategies before the game starts. The team-maxmin equilibrium with correlation (TMECor)…

Automated market makers (AMMs) allocate fee revenue \textit{proportional} to the amount of liquidity investors deposit. In this paper, we study the economic consequences of the competition between passive liquidity providers (LPs) caused by…

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…

We consider dynamic auctions for finding Walrasian equilibria in markets with indivisible items and strong gross substitutes valuation functions. Each price adjustment step in these auction algorithms requires finding an inclusion-wise…

We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…

This paper considers the problem of finding strategies that satisfy a mixture of sure and threshold objectives in Markov decision processes. We focus on a single $\omega$-regular objective expressed as parity that must be surely met while…

Examining the mechanisms underlying the formation and evolution of opinions within real-world social systems, which consist of numerous individuals, can provide valuable insights for effective social functioning and informed business…

We introduce the class of \textit{Continuous Thiele's Rules} that generalize the familiar \textbf{Thiele's rules} \cite{janson2018phragmens} of multi-winner voting to distribution aggregation problems. Each rule in that class maximizes…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…

Restaking protocols have aggregated billions of dollars of security by utilizing token incentives and payments. A natural question to ask is: How much security do restaked services \emph{really} need to purchase? To answer this question, we…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…