随机二元博弈的 Kelly 准则与效用函数优化:次鞅与超鞅机制
概率论
2025-02-25 v1
摘要
本文提出了 Kelly 准则的一种重新表述。设 G \mathfrak{G} G 为一般的随机伯努利二元博弈,其 N N N 次试验的结果为 Z ( I ) ∈ { − 1 , 1 } \mathscr{Z}(I)\in\lbrace -1,1\rbrace Z ( I ) ∈ { − 1 , 1 } ,其中 I = 1... N I=1...N I = 1... N 。二项概率为 P ( Z ( I ) = 1 ) = p \mathsf{P}(\mathscr{Z}(I)=1)=p P ( Z ( I ) = 1 ) = p 和 P ( Z ( I ) = − 1 ) = q {\mathsf{P}}(\mathscr{Z}(I)=-1)=q P ( Z ( I ) = − 1 ) = q ,且 p + q = 1 p+q=1 p + q = 1 。对于公平博弈,p = q = 1 2 p=q=\tfrac{1}{2} p = q = 2 1 ;对于有偏博弈,p > q p>q p > q 。如果 W ( 0 ) \mathscr{W}(0) W ( 0 ) 是初始财富,那么在第 I I I 次试验中,下注比例为 F \mathcal{F} F ,即下注额为 B ( I ) = F W ( I − 1 ) B(I)=\mathcal{F}\mathscr{W}(I-1) B ( I ) = F W ( I − 1 ) 。如果下注 B ( I ) B(I) B ( I ) 且 Z ( I ) = + 1 \mathscr{Z}(I)=+1 Z ( I ) = + 1 ,则收回原始下注额并赢得 B ( I ) B(I) B ( I ) ;若 Z ( I ) = − 1 \mathscr{Z}(I)=-1 Z ( I ) = − 1 ,则损失 B ( I ) B(I) B ( I ) 。对于大 N N N ,第 N N N 次试验/下注时的财富为随机游走 W ( N ) = W ( 0 ) + ∑ I = 1 N B ( I ) Z ( I ) = W ( 0 ) ∏ I = 1 N ( 1 + F Z ( I ) ) \mathscr{W}(N)=\mathscr{W} (0)+\sum_{I=1}^{N}B(I)\mathscr{Z}(I)=\mathscr{W}(0)\prod_{I=1}^{N}(1+\mathcal{F}\mathscr{Z}(I)) W ( N ) = W ( 0 ) + ∑ I = 1 N B ( I ) Z ( I ) = W ( 0 ) ∏ I = 1 N ( 1 + F Z ( I )) ,其期望为 E [ W ( N ) ] \mathsf{E}[\mathscr{W}(N)] E [ W ( N )] 。定义“效用函数” U ( F , p ) = E [ log ( W ( N ) / W ( 0 ) ) 1 / N ] \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F},p)=\mathsf{E}[\log(\mathscr{W}(N)/\mathscr{W}(0))^{1/N}] U ( F , p ) = E [ log ( W ( N ) / W ( 0 ) ) 1/ N ] ,则 U ( F , p ) \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F},p) U ( F , p ) 由 Kelly 比例 F = F K = p − q = 2 p − 1 \mathcal{F}=\mathcal{F}_{K}=p-q=2p-1 F = F K = p − q = 2 p − 1 优化,这本质上是 U ( F , p ) \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F},p) U ( F , p ) 的一个临界点。此外,U ( F K , p ) \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F}_{K},p) U ( F K , p ) 可与 Shannon 熵相关联。若 [ 0 , 1 ] = [ 0 , F ∗ ) ⋃ [ F ∗ ] ⋃ ( F ∗ , 1 ] [0,1]=[0,\mathcal{F}_{*})\bigcup [\mathcal{F}_{*}]\bigcup (\mathcal{F}_{*},1] [ 0 , 1 ] = [ 0 , F ∗ ) ⋃ [ F ∗ ] ⋃ ( F ∗ , 1 ] 且 U ( F ∗ , p ) = 0 \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F}_{*},p)=0 U ( F ∗ , p ) = 0 ,则当 p > 1 / 2 p>1/2 p > 1/2 时,U ( F , p ) > 0 , ∀ F ∈ [ 0 , F ∗ ) \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F},p)>0, \forall\mathcal{F}\in[0,\mathcal{F}_{*}) U ( F , p ) > 0 , ∀ F ∈ [ 0 , F ∗ ) 且 W ( N ) \mathscr{W}(N) W ( N ) 为次鞅;同时 U ( F , p ) < 0 , ∀ F ∈ ( F ∗ , 1 ] \mathsf{U}(\mathcal{F},p)<0,\forall \mathcal{F}\in(\mathcal{F}_{*},1] U ( F , p ) < 0 , ∀ F ∈ ( F ∗ , 1 ] ,且 W ( F , p ) \mathscr{W}(\mathcal{F},p) W ( F , p ) 为超鞅。我们推导了方差与波动率 V A R ( W ( N ) ) \mathsf{VAR}(\mathscr{W}(N)) VAR ( W ( N )) 和 σ ( W ( N ) ) = V A R ( W ( N ) ) \sigma(\mathscr{W}(N))=\sqrt{\mathsf{VAR}(\mathscr{W}(N)}) σ ( W ( N )) = VAR ( W ( N ) ) 的估计。对于大 N N N 且 F = F K \mathcal{F}=\mathcal{F}_{K} F = F K ,E [ W ( N ) ] \mathsf{E}[\mathscr{W}(N)] E [ W ( N )] 呈指数增长。
引用
@article{arxiv.2502.16859,
title = {The Kelly Criterion And Utility Function Optimisation For Stochastic Binary Games: Submartingale And Supermartingale Regimes},
author = {Steven D Miller},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.16859},
year = {2025}
}
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