Comparing Contract-Based Support Mechanisms for Long-Duration Energy Storage
系统与控制
2026-05-19 v1 系统与控制
摘要
Long-duration energy storage (LDES) faces significant revenue volatility that impedes investment. This paper evaluates four contract-based support mechanisms using an equilibrium model with risk-averse investors and incomplete risk markets. Applied to a stylized 2035 Great Britain case, we find that all mechanisms can achieve the targeted LDES capacity but differ substantially in cost-effectiveness and risk-aversion sensitivity. Contracts that eliminate revenue volatility achieve the lowest costs but may weaken operational incentives, while contracts that preserve market exposure maintain incentives at higher costs.
引用
@article{arxiv.2605.18582,
title = {Comparing Contract-Based Support Mechanisms for Long-Duration Energy Storage},
author = {Adam Suski and Elina Spyrou and Jacob Mays and Richard Green},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.18582},
year = {2026}
}
备注
Accepted for presentation at the 22nd International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM26), Trondheim, Norway, 2026